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SUMMARY**Elena Filatova****MUSLIM TATARS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE**

Thanks to Islam Tatar people of the Western provinces of the Russian Empire escaped assimilation within the Christian environment. Unification of the denomination governance according the Orthodox Christian Church model was the main direction state policy towards Muslim people in these provinces. As a result, the following administrative structure had been developed: the Emperor - the Department of Religious Affairs of Foreign Confessions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) - Tauride Mohammedan Spiritual administration - Mullah - a Muslim congregation.

Keywords: Islam, the Western provinces of the Russian Empire, Muslim people, Tauride Mohammedan Spiritual administration.

Oxana ZEMTSOVA**ISMAIL GASPRINSKII AND THE BIRTH OF JADIDISM AMONG MUSLIM TATARS**

Стаття присвячена виникненню новометодного руху серед мусульман Російської імперії, який був заснований Ісмаїлом Гаспрінським в Бахчисараї в Криму. Дослідження показує як реформи в освіті поширилися на повсякденне життя мусульман Російської імперії та стали символом мусульманського націоналізму, який зароджувався.

Ключові слова: мусульмани, націоналізм, освіта, джадидизм.

The problem of *jadidism*, a Muslim movement that appeared in the second half of the 19th century in the Crimea, and gradually spread onto all the other 'Muslim' regions of the empire, has a diverse and multileveled historiography. Kemal Karpat's presentation of Russia's Eastern provinces as likely targets for

the spread of Pan-Islamism shows that considerable change was taking place among the Muslim population and explains the particular concern of the empire about the Tatar population and religious and educational activities of its respective elites.¹

Following the study of Benningsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejey on the history of the Muslim national movement in tsarist times and during the civil war,² many more works on the subject appeared.³ In this respect subjects that deserve greatest attention are the appearance of reforms in the Muslim *milieu*, the subsequent emergence of *jadidism* which, born as a movement within educational framework, later called upon social changes and Muslim mobilization.⁴ Several works deal with the dichotomy of *jadid-quadimist* schools in the Russian empire.⁵

Although it is generally accepted that the 'father' of *jadidism*, which first started as a reform in education, and gradually acquired more ideological and political coloring, was a Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinskii, the reform movement is also connected with the name of a Middle Volga Tatar Shigabutdin Mardzhani. In the second half of the 19th century, his ideas reformed Muslim education and transformed the Tatar society itself, bringing it to the new level of development. The ideas of Mardzhani were rather moderate, but they had a steadier conceptual basis: according to him, it was necessary to make a reform in the religious consciousness of the Muslims, without reforming the dogmas of Islam. He proposed the return to early Islam, its purification from the shortcomings of later development. An educated Muslim should know the sources of the religion and on their basis he should be able to make the *idzhtikhad*. Proper Muslim education, free of scholasticism should borrow the achievements of the western civilization and this combination was to trigger the rise of Tatar ethnic consciousness.

It is here that the Muslim ethnic claims appear - Mardzhani imagined that the reformed society would first get its autonomy in the Russian empire and then its own statehood.⁶ According to Uli Schamiloglu, Mardzhani was the first person who tried to identify the Muslims of the Volga-Kama region in ethnic terms. In 1880s he called them 'Kazan Tatars' and linked their genealogy to the Volga Bulgar state, existing in this region between the tenth and the thirteenth centuries.⁷ The questions he studied were the ones that still now await their answers: "Did the Turkic-speaking Muslims in the Russian empire constitute a common 'Turk-Tatar'/'Bulgar'/'Muslim' nation or multiple small nations? And did the Volga-Ural Muslims descend from the Tatars of the Golden Horde, the Bulghar Khanate, or a combination of both?"⁸ The first step towards this one's identity, Mardzhani argued, was not to refuse to be called a Tatar:

“Some consider it a vice to be called Tatar, avoiding this name, saying that we are Muslims, not Tatars. Poor things! If you are not a Tatar, a Tajik, a Noghai; and you are not a Chinese, Russian, French, Prussian or a German, then who are you?”⁹

Furthermore, in order to let Muslims participate in the state activities, the most capable of them should try and get themselves positions in the state administration in order to protect the interests of Muslims. This was something he had tried as early as 1862 but failed.

But in fact, it was more the traditionalists who found fault with Mardzhani's ideas, not the authorities, and his name often remains in the shade and he is called 'not a real reformist.'¹⁰ Mardzhani's views on education were progressive enough for his time, as he understood the necessity of both conscious studies of Islamic heritage and receiving modern Russian education. He maintained that learning Russian was not against the rules of the *sharia* as many mullahs tried to show (in fact, he taught Muslim religion in the Kazan Tatar teacher training college for nine years) and won the fame of a missionary, heretic and an apostate in the Muslim conservative circles. Mardzhani, being a religious reformer, claimed that Islam did not contradict European science and school reforms, but on the contrary could profit from coexistence with them.

Ismail bei Gasprinskii, the head of Bakhchisarai in Crimea and the editor of the newspaper “*Terdzhiman*” (Translator) that was printed from 1883 to 1918 in both Russian and Ottoman Turkish, was the founder of *jadidism*, or the use of the new, sound method in teaching. *Qadimists*, old-method teachers, used the system of syllables in teaching reading, when letters were made into syllables and syllables into words. The method of *jadids* was based on the approach that every letter corresponded to a sound. This not only simplified the process of learning to read, but generally shortened the time of studies, leaving thus enough time to study secular subjects at *madrasah*. Gasprinskii was greatly inspired by Mardzhani's ideas and he himself published a number of philosophical works, which were often read by his Russian contemporaries as appeals to pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism.¹¹ These texts are far more important than the newspaper in understanding of the process of nation formation and the rise of nationalism among the Muslims.

Gasprinskii's works were devoted to the inner problems of Muslim peoples of Russia and their integration into the existent social, cultural and educational environment. They represented the advanced stage in the struggle of various Muslim communities in Russia for cultural self-preservation, using their resources to reconstruct themselves into new sociopolitical entities. In fact, Gasprinskii raised several very sharp questions concerning the relations be-

tween the Russian authorities and Muslim subjects and the Russian civilizing mission itself:

“The Russian rule over Tatars until now, as far as I know, was expressed in the following: ‘I own, you pay and live as you wish’. This is very easy, but it does not make sense. Indeed, what sort of relations should there be established between Russians and Tatars? What should Tatars, Russian Muslims, be in relation to Russian and vice versa? What is the good sensible aim of the Russian power in relation to Muslim non-Russians? What should Russians do for them and how and what should they demand from them and how? Should Russians and Russian Muslims live on the same land as casual partners, neighbors, or should there be developed closer ties like between the children of our great and vast motherhood?”¹²

He argued that the idea of the Russian civilizing mission in the East was welcome, but its essence should go deeper than simply changing “*quadii* into *uezdnui nachalnik*, *naib* into *pristav*, *bekstvo* into provinces, silk gowns into *dvoryanskii vorotnik*”.¹³ The civilizing mission should, instead, lead Russian and Muslim subjects to mutually beneficial coexistence. It should, as Gasprinskii saw it, make Muslims aware of the interests of Russia and the state aims and ideas.

In response to the civilizing attempt of the imperial centre, Gasprinskii wanted to create a united Muslim community. Some of his ideas can be found in his novel “Letters from France” where he used a literary trope, a dream, in which the main character found himself in an ideal country, where a high level of civilization was united with the perfect morals of Muslims who were very religious and consciously performed their devotional duties. The ideal country was, in fact, no other than the Russian empire, provided that the Turkic peoples were united and autonomous. Gasprinskii was dreaming of raising “a Russian national flag in the middle of which there would be a small green field with a white crescent,”¹⁴ although he admitted that his ideas at that time were utopian.

Dowler claims that Gasprinskii’s pan-Turkism “was primarily cultural and linguistic and scarcely political.”¹⁵ While I do agree that one of main ideas was the creation of a single Turkic language, the one later called the language of Gasprinskii, in which *Terdzhiman* was printed and also strengthening the ties among Turkic peoples of Russia, his pan-Turkism was political enough to scare the authorities. In fact, Il’minskii more than once warned Pobedonostsev against the danger coming from the Crimean Tatars, calling them “progressivists and nationalists.”¹⁶

I believe, one cannot give a single assessment to Gasprinskii’s idea of Orthodox-Muslim coexistence as well as the idea of unification of the Russian

Muslims which, however progressive, was not going to happen and the reason was not only the suspicion and resistance coming from the imperial centre, but also the fact that Islamic peoples of Russia stayed at different levels of cultural and linguistic development and different groups had their own projects.

At the end of the 19th century, Muslim educational system was characterized by the co-existence of *jadid* and *quadimist* schools. In the new-method *madrasah*, the education lasted four years and was conducted in Tatar with a clearly-set curriculum and sufficient number of teachers. The subjects studied included Tatar, geography, arithmetic, an introduction to Sacred history, history of Islam, Qur'an. In the old-method *madrasah*, on the contrary, there was no strict division into subjects and even the primer was in Persian. The knowledge was evaluated not according to the sum of knowledge, but the skills the student acquired to get him a certain position in the Muslim community. A missionary Koblov summed up the aims of such education: "Confessional school is very important for Muslims: it disciplines them, turning them into an organized mass of people, where in practice the motto 'all for one and one for all' is at work."¹⁷

In the second half of the 19th century this classic Muslim tradition could not respond to the challenging situation in Russia, the role that was taken over by new-method Muslim school, the students of which had both Muslim and European knowledge.

In spite of the evident confrontation of *quadimists* and *jadids*, this dichotomy was far from absolute. We will take just one example of the imam of St. Petersburg Ataulah Bayazitov who, although a graduate of a *quadimist* madrasah and serving the interests of the state, welcomed Russian and European education for Muslims. I believe that Geraci has misrepresented his personality describing him as a traditionalist opposing any reform in Muslim education.¹⁸

The first and most famous work of Bayazitov was "Islam and science" (1883), which was a protest against the speech of Ernest Renan given in the French scientific association on the 19th of March 1883. Bayazitov objected to Renan's conclusion that Islam contradicted the achievements of modern science. In his later book "Islam and progress" Bayazitov dealt with the problem of the place of Islam in the world claiming that it was not alien to modernity. He accused Europe of measuring Islam by its own means and, having found something unfamiliar and non-standard, rejecting it, calling it a conservative phenomenon that was holding back the social progress in the East.¹⁹

Besides, Bayazitov had tried for many years to publish a newspaper in Russian and Tatar, proposing various projects and basically giving the same grounds as Gasprinskii - to keep Tatars informed of what is going on in the empire, to help them understand the laws and also to promote the reforms in Muslim edu-

cation, which had to be supplemented by teaching of science and lay subjects as well as the Russian language. It was only in 1905 that Bayazitov managed to break through the censorship with the newspaper "Nur" ("Light").

The dichotomy *quadimists* - *jadids* certainly went far beyond the method of learning to read. Dudoignon believes, for instance, that the representatives of these two camps differently defined the functions of the institutions inside the Muslim community (*mahalla*). While the *quadimists* believed that one should give preference to collective governing and collective management of the money and the traditional structure of the *mahalla* should be preserved intact, the *jadids* believed that there was nothing wrong in individual development of the members of *mahalla*.²⁰

The problem with the dichotomy *quadimist-jadid* is that, for the authorities, it gradually came to define not only adherence to educational system, but became a marker of political activity. Backward *quadimists*, who had protested against the introduction of Russian in *mekteb* and *madrasah*, suddenly came to be seen as conformist, loyal and collaborating. *Jadidism*, on the contrary, became somewhat synonymous to separatism.

At the end of the 19th-beginning of the 20th century, the authorities started to show concerns lest the Muslim of Russia were influenced by the events in Turkey, ideas of pan-Turkism started to be perceived as a threat to the Russian statehood and 'Muslim question' appeared. Elena Campbell claims that what caused the appearance of the Muslim question was the uneasy situation in Turkestan, namely the Andijan uprising of 1898,²¹ but I suppose that the disturbances in Kazan and Crimea also contributed to it.

While the question of coexistence of lay and religious components in Tatar educational institutions as well as Muslim activities on the Russian political arena after 1905 require further analysis in the present research and the present work does not claim a complete presentation of the problem, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the inner reforms taking place in the Muslim community in the second half of the 19th century resulted in only partial implementation of acculturation on the basis of the Russian language. Here I support Mustafa Tuna's argument that, under the influence of both the Russian state and Muslim intellectuals, the Muslims of Russia did adapt to the modernity but since they "felt these changes and the need to adapt them only partially...they adapted only partially."²²

The imperial policy, which Olivier Roy characterizes as both 'ideological assimilation which respects ethnic specificity and a collaboration between two communities in a common state project',²³ made the Russian Muslims politically active. Started as a reform within Islamic tradition, Muslim education at

madrasahs gradually adopted a secular model which was more evident after the years 1905-7. Islam as a religious system lost its attraction for many graduates and they, under the influence of Russian and European modernity, engaged themselves into social reforms, leaving behind purely religious scope.²⁴

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Oxana Zemtsova

ISMAIL GASPRINSKII AND THE BIRTH OF JADIDISM AMONG MUSLIM TATARS

This paper deals with the appearance of a new-method movement among the Muslims of the Russian empire initiated by Ismail Gasprinskii in Bakhchisarai, Crimea. It discusses the way reforms in education spread onto the every-day life of the imperial Muslims and became the embodiment of the rising Muslim nationalism.

Key words: Muslims, nationalism, education, jadidism.